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Abstract
 Bilateral damage to the human amygdala impairs retrieval
of emotional and social information from faces. An important
unanswered question concerns the speciªcity of the impair-
ment for faces. To address this question, we examined prefer-
ences for a broad class of visual stimuli in two subjects with
complete bilateral amygdala damage, both of whom were im-
paired in judgments of faces. Relative to controls, the subjects
showed a positive bias for simple nonsense ªgures, color pat-
terns, three-dimensional-looking objects and landscapes. The
impairment was most pronounced in regard to those stimuli
that are normally liked the least. The human amygdala thus
appears to play a general role in guiding preferences for visual
stimuli that are normally judged to be aversive. 
INTRODUCTION
A large body of work, primarily from studies in animals,
has demonstrated the amygdala’s importance in process-
ing socially and emotionally relevant stimuli. Bilateral
amygdala damage results in severe impairment in behav-
iors (and in the retrieval of knowledge) that normally are
triggered by stimuli of direct importance to an animal’s
survival. The clearest demonstrations have come from
paradigms in which the emotional signiªcance of a
stimulus can be experimentally manipulated, such as fear
conditioning (Davis, 1992; Le Doux, 1996). The amygdala
also plays a clear role in regard to stimuli encountered
under ecologically more natural conditions: for instance,
rats with bilateral amygdala damage show no fear of cats
(Blanchard & Blanchard, 1972), and monkeys with such
damage are abnormally tame and placid in their interac-
tions with people or with other monkeys (Amaral, Capi-
tanio, Machado, Mason, & Mendoza, 1997; Kling &
Brothers, 1992; Meunier, Bachevalier, Murray, Malkova, &
Mishkin, 1996; Rosvold, Mirsky, & Pribram, 1954; Weis-
krantz, 1956). Convergent neurophysiological data are
available: Neurons within the primate amygdala respond
to socially relevant stimuli, such as faces (Fried, MacDon-
ald, & Wilson, 1997; Rolls, 1992) and pictures of complex
social interactions (Brothers, Ring, & Kling, 1990).
Although impairments in real-life behavior following
amygdala damage tend to be most apparent in the social
domain (i.e., in regard to stimuli depicting, or behaviors
directed at, other animals), there is evidence that the
amygdala also plays a role in ecologically valid responses
toward nonsocial stimuli. For instance, amygdalecto-
mized monkeys will more readily approach unfamiliar
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objects and appear less cautious in novel environments
than normal monkeys (Amaral et al., 1997). Consonant
with these ªndings, neurophysiological activity of neu-
rons within the primate amygdala is modulated by
the affective signiªcance of a variety of nonsocial sen-
sory stimuli (Muramoto, Ono, Nishijo, & Fukuda, 1993;
Nishijo, Ono, & Nishino, 1988). All these data provide
strong support for the view that the amygdala plays a
critical role both in social behavior and in emotional
response to nonsocial stimuli. However, nearly all avail-
able evidence has come from studies in nonhuman ani-
mals.
We have reported that bilateral amygdala damage also
impairs social behavior in humans (Adolphs, Tranel,
Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Tranel & Hyman, 1990). In
particular, such damage impairs judgments of the ap-
proachability and trustworthiness of other individuals on
the basis of their facial appearance (Adolphs, Tranel, &
Damasio, 1998). Subjects with bilateral amygdala damage
fail to judge people who look unapproachable and un-
trustworthy as such, while giving normal judgments to
individuals who look approachable and trustworthy. The
impairment appears to be limited to judging people
from their faces and does not extend to judging people
from lexical descriptions (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio,
1998). Additionally, subjects with bilateral amygdala dam-
age are impaired in recognizing certain negative emo-
tions from facial expressions, notably fear and anger
(Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs,
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Broks et al., 1998;
Calder et al., 1996; Young et al., 1995). The ªndings from
humans are thus broadly consistent with the ªndings
from animals and support a role for the amygdala in
triggering pertinent knowledge and behavior when sub-
jects are confronted with social stimuli that signal poten-
tial threat or danger.
Studies of the human amygdala have predominantly
found evidence for the amygdala’s involvement in re-
trieving knowledge regarding faces. But this emphasis on
faces could be artifactual: Few studies have used stimuli
other than faces, and faces may also be the stimuli that
most robustly trigger retrieval of social knowledge, due
to the paramount role they play in real-life social behav-
ior. Given that a few studies have implicated the human
amygdala in processing auditory (Scott et al., 1997), ol-
factory (Zald & Pardo, 1997), or gustatory (Zald, Lee,
Fluegel, & Pardo, 1998) emotional stimuli, we expected
the amygdala to play a more general role in triggering
emotional and social knowledge.
The present report thus addresses an important unan-
swered question: To what extent might the human
amygdala participate in making emotionally relevant
judgments regarding visual stimuli that are clearly not
social? That is, might the above described impairments
in judging faces extend to other classes of visual stimuli?
To address this issue, we asked two subjects with com-
plete bilateral amygdala damage (SM-046 and RH-1951;
Figure 1) to rate how much they liked visual stimuli
other than faces. Both subjects had previously been
found to be severely impaired in similar judgments re-
garding faces (Adolphs et al., 1998). To obtain a broad
assessment, we asked subjects to rate their preferences
for four different classes of visual stimuli: unidentiªable
black-and-white ªgures, Mondrian color patterns, col-
ored spheres, and colored landscapes (Figure 2). Perfor-
mances from the two subjects with bilateral amygdala
damage were compared to a group of young and a group
of older normal controls.
RESULTS
The two groups of normal controls did not differ in their
ratings of the four classes of stimuli, as conªrmed by a
one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on
subjects’ mean ratings (Wilks Lambda = 0.94; F(4) = 1.29;
p = 0.28). For statistical comparisons with data from
amygdala subjects, we therefore pooled the data from
the two control groups.
We divided the ratings that subjects assigned to the
stimuli in two, one half contained the stimuli to which
control subjects gave the most negative ratings and the
other contained those to which controls gave the most
positive ratings. Both SM-046 and RH-1951 gave higher
ratings to the stimuli normally given the most negative
ratings (Figure 3). The results were especially striking for
the nonsense line drawings and spheres: SM-046 and
RH-1951 gave mean positive ratings to these stimuli even
when mean control ratings were negative. By contrast,
the mean ratings that SM-046 and RH-1951 assigned to
stimuli that received the most positive ratings from nor-
mal controls did not differ from the control group (Fig-
ure 3). Statistical analysis of these data showed that
amygdala subjects were signiªcantly impaired in rating
that half of the nonsense ªgures and spheres that nor-
mally receive the most negative ratings (t = −15.3; p <
0.001 for line drawings and t = −10.0; p < 0.05 for
spheres) but not those that normally receive the most
positive ratings (ps > 0.4; one-tailed t tests on subjects’
mean ratings for the given classes of stimuli, with p
values Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons).
Due to the small number of stimuli and the large vari-
ance in ratings given by subjects (including controls),
statistical signiªcance was not attained for the data from
Mondrians or landscapes (ps > 0.1). Nonetheless, sub-
jects with bilateral amygdala damage gave both Mondri-
Figure 1. Bilateral amygdala lesions as seen in magnetic resonance scans of the brains of SM-046 (left) and RH-1951 (right). Shown on the far
left is a three-dimensional reconstruction of SM-046’s brain from MR scans indicating the plane of section for the other images. SM-046 has bilat-
eral damage restricted to the amygdala; RH-1951 has extensive bilateral damage to amygdala, hippocampus, and surrounding cortices.
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ans and landscapes more positive ratings than the mean
control rating, for that half of the stimuli normally receiv-
ing the most negative ratings (Figure 3).
The data of Figure 3 suggest that subjects with bilat-
eral amygdala lesions gave the most abnormal ratings to
those stimuli that normally receive the most negative
ratings. An analysis of the extent to which SM-046 and
RH-1951’s ratings deviated from the control mean for
each individual stimulus conªrmed this impression (Fig-
ure 4): The most abnormal ratings were given to those
stimuli that were rated the most negatively by controls.
Regressions of the deviations of ratings given by
amygdala subjects on the rank-order of the ratings given
to stimuli by normal controls revealed statistical sig-
niªcance in several cases, as indicated in the ªgure.
Moreover, all regressions were in the same direction for
the four different classes of stimuli: Subjects with
amygdala damage gave abnormally positive ratings to
stimuli for which normal controls gave the most nega-
tive ratings. This pattern of performance was found pre-
viously in subjects with bilateral amygdala damage, in
regard to judging social attributes of faces (Adolphs et
al., 1998).
DISCUSSION
Summary of Findings
The ªndings from this study show that bilateral amygdala
damage in humans results in abnormally positive ratings
of likability for several classes of visual stimuli other than
faces. The data show a close parallel to those reported
in regard to social judgments of faces (Adolphs et al.,
1998): Subjects with amygdala damage endorse positive
ratings for stimuli that normal subjects rate negatively. As
with social judgment of faces, this positive bias was most
pronounced in regard to those stimuli that normal sub-
jects gave the most negative likability ratings. The human
amygdala thus appears to play a general role in guiding
preferences for visual stimuli that are normally judged to
be aversive or to predict aversive consequences. This
function may be especially critical, or may be most per-
spicuous, in regard to judgment of social stimuli such as
faces.
Although the data clearly show a positive bias by
subjects with bilateral amygdala damage, and although
the deviation of the amygdala subjects’ ratings from
normal ratings was greatest for those stimuli that nor-
mally receive the most negative ratings, we cannot deªni-
tively conclude that the impairment is restricted to
judging negative (disliked, aversive) stimuli. In fact, an
inspection of SM-046’s data in Figure 3 shows that, like
normals, she generally gave “likable” stimuli more posi-
tive ratings than “dislikable” stimuli. It thus remains pos-
sible that the disproportionate impairment seen for the
most dislikable stimuli is due to a general positive bias,
together with a ceiling effect introduced by our
bounded rating scale. It might be the case that it is
simply possible to deviate more in the positive direction
for the dislikable stimuli than for the likable stimuli.
Future experiments involving direct pairwise compari-
sons between stimuli (such as have been carried out in
regard to faces; Adolphs et al., 1998) would be needed
to exclude this possibility.
The established role of the human amygdala in recog-
nizing facial expressions of fear, its role in recognizing
untrustworthiness and avoidance of faces, and the pre-
sent evidence for a role in recognizing dislike in nonso-
cial stimuli all make plausible the following hypothesis.
Stimuli that have been associated with negative (aver-
sive) consequences in the past (possibly either in indi-
vidual experience or through phylogeny) activate the
amygdala to trigger responses such that the organism
can avoid the aversive consequence that is predicted by
the stimulus. This hypothesis is consonant with a large
body of data from studies in animals, using both the
lesion method and direct neurophysiological recording
(Davis, 1992; Le Doux, 1996; Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gal-
lagher, 1998). The amygdala may trigger behavioral reac-
tion, conscious knowledge that the stimulus predicts
something “bad,” or a feeling that one does not like, or
wishes to avoid, the stimulus.
Factors Contributing to Preference Judgments
A difªcult question concerns how stimuli in the task are
categorized as similar to previously encountered stimuli
that coincided with negative contingencies or conse-
quences. What precisely is it about, say, an unidentiªable
Figure 2. Examples of stimuli used. From left to right: nonsense line ªgure, Mondrian, sphere, landscape.
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nonsense ªgure or a colored sphere that makes a subject
like or dislike the item? Although there is some debate
in the literature, complexity (Wohlwill, 1968), amplitude
spectra (Kleiner, 1987), prior exposure (Kunst-Wilson &
Zajonc, 1980), and averageness (Langlois & Roggman,
1990), among other factors, have all been proposed to
inºuence preferences for visual stimuli. It will be a chal-
lenge for future studies to begin to dissect the relative
contributions these factors make to judging stimuli such
as those we used here and to investigate their possible
dependency on the amygdala.
A related issue concerns the connection between
likability judgments and the retrieval of emotionally rele-
vant knowledge about the stimuli, on which such judg-
ments may in part be based. It is important to note that
the amygdala is not necessary for all types of judgments
regarding potentially aversive stimuli. For instance, an
amnesic patient with complete bilateral amygdala dam-
age was found to have normal covert preferences for
other people: He could judge which people had been
kind to him in the past and which had not (his amnesia
precluded overt judgments; Tranel & Damasio, 1993).
Additionally, patients with bilateral amygdala damage are
not impaired in their personal emotional judgments of
complex visual stimuli that show recognizably emotional
objects or scenes (e.g., Adolphs, Cahill, Schul, & Babinsky,
1997). However, the stimuli used in that study differed
importantly from the ones used in the present study, in
Figure 3. Mean ratings given by subjects to that half of the stimuli that normal controls assign the most negative ratings (left half of each
split graph) and to that half of the stimuli that normal controls assign the most positive ratings (right half of each split graph). Means and
standard deviations are shown for young normal controls and older normal controls; individual mean ratings are shown for SM-046 and RH-
1951.
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that recognizing the stimulus (e.g., picture of a car acci-
dent or of a mutilated person) could trigger sufªcient
declarative knowledge on the basis of which a normal
emotional judgment could be made. Such explicit point-
ers toward emotionally relevant information may not be
triggered by the stimuli we used here, which cannot be
recognized as obviously depicting an emotionally aver-
sive situation or event.
Perhaps for similar reasons, subjects with bilateral
amygdala damage are not impaired in judging recogniz-
able scenes or objects with respect to pleasantness or
unpleasantness (Hamann, Cahill, & Squire, 1997; Adolphs,
Russell, & Tranel, 1999). Interestingly, a subject with bi-
lateral amygdala damage was impaired in recognizing the
emotional arousal of certain classes of unpleasant stimuli,
even though she recognized their unpleasantness nor-
mally (Adolphs et al., 1999). All the above ªndings argue
that there are multiple mechanisms for the retrieval of
knowledge regarding various attributes of emotional
stimuli. The amygdala plays a critical role only for a
subset of these, which may be a function of the mode
of knowledge retrieval (overt/covert, motor re-
sponse/verbal response/autonomic response, etc.) and
of the type of knowledge retrieved (e.g., knowledge of
Figure 4. Standard deviations from the mean of the normal controls for RH-1951 () and SM-046 (). Stimuli are rank-ordered on the x-axis
according to the mean ratings that normal controls (young and old collapsed) gave them. For each dataset, we regressed the amygdala subject’s
deviation against the normal controls’ rank order (y value against x value); r2 and p values resulting from this regression are indicated on the
graphs.
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pleasantness, arousal, or the speciªc emotion category;
knowledge that can be encoded verbally or not; and so
on). The extent to which each of these contributes to
judgments of likability as assessed in the present study
remains to be fully determined.
It would be of interest also to extend this line of
investigation to other classes of stimuli. Important issues
would include an examination of judgments of social
visual stimuli other than faces (e.g., body posture) and
of social and nonsocial stimuli in sensory modalities
other than vision. Another interesting question concerns
the relative contributions of the amygdala to preferences
that are innate and to preferences that are acquired
through experience. Either, or both, innate and acquired
preferences could account for the data we presented
here: Subjects may like a speciªc stimulus because they
have an innate bias for the stimulus or because the
stimulus is associated with a particular prior experience.
Examination of subjects who acquired their amygdala
damage at different ages could provide insight into this
difªcult issue and connect with the extensive literature
on emotional and social development in normal indi-
viduals (Saarni, Mumme, & Campos, 1997).
METHODS
Subjects
We examined two subjects with bilateral amygdala dam-
age, SM-046 (a 31-year-old woman) and RH-1951 (a 42-
year-old man). Both subjects have been described
previously, have normal visuoperceptual function, and
are severely impaired in processing social (Adolphs et
al., 1998) and emotional (Adolphs et al., 1994, and un-
published observations) information from faces. Their
performances were compared to those given by 114
normal control subjects (or a subset thereof, as indicated
below). Because the mean age of the normal controls
(college students; mean age = 19 ± 1) was younger than
that of our brain-damaged subjects, we tested an addi-
tional 8 older normal subjects (4 males, 4 females; 59 ±
12 years old). All subjects had given informed consent to
participate in these studies.
Both SM-046 and RH-1951 have complete bilateral
damage to the amygdala. SM-046’s lesions are conªned
to the amygdala, with the exception of minimal damage
to the anterior entorhinal cortex. The lesions are a con-
sequence of mineralization and atrophy of the amygdala
due to Urbach-Wiethe disease. RH-1951’s lesions are due
to herpes simplex encephalitis at age 28, which resulted
in complete destruction of the amygdala and surround-
ing structures. We obtained detailed neuroanatomical
information on SM-046 and RH-1951 from serial mag-
netic resonance (MR) scans suitable for subsequent
three-dimensional reconstruction of subjects’ brains
(Damasio & Frank, 1992) (Figure 1).
Stimuli
Individual stimuli were unfamiliar to all subjects, to avoid
the inºuence of a subject’s personal experience with a
speciªc stimulus. We investigated stimuli that derive
from classes of items that subjects generally have some
familiarity with (landscapes, planets) and stimuli that
derive from classes of items that subjects likely have
never seen before (nonsense ªgures, Mondrian pat-
terns).
We used four types of stimuli: simple unidentiªable
black-and-white nonsense line drawings (drawn on a
white background), arrangements of colored rectangles
(Mondrians), colored spheres that had been rendered to
look three-dimensional (resembling planets in appear-
ance), and computer-generated landscapes. Examples of
each type of stimulus are shown in Figure 2. All stimuli
were shown one at a time in random order, without time
limit, on a backward-projection screen from a slide pro-
jector in a darkened room. Subjects were asked to rate
how much they liked each stimulus, on a scale of −3 to
+3. After a subject rated the stimulus, there was a 3-sec
interstimulus-interval showing a black screen before the
next stimulus came on. Negative ratings corresponded
to dislike of the stimulus; positive ratings corresponded
to liking the stimulus. The number of normal control
subjects was 85 for the unrecognizable ªgures, 111 for
spheres, and 114 for Mondrians and landscapes.
Stimuli were selected from a larger set, to be evenly
distributed between very disliked (mean control rating
near −3) to very liked (mean control rating near +3) by
normal subjects.
Unidentiªable line drawings. Twenty-nine unidentiª-
able black nonsense ªgures were shown on a plain
white background.
Mondrians. Eight images of Mondrians were chosen
from a larger set. All were vividly colored collages of
rectangles.
Spheres. Thirty-one images of a three-dimensional
sphere with colored patterns on it were computer
generated. These often resembled planets in appear-
ance (cf. Figure 2). Some fog and directional lighting
were used to enhance the three-dimensional effect.
Landscapes. Ten images of landscapes were computer
generated using the program KPT Bryce. They showed
three-dimensional renditions of terrain in which the
topography, lighting, clouds, and fog had been manipu-
lated with the aim to elicit strong positive or negative
emotional feelings in viewers.
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